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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LUIS A. GUZMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030019-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the admission of the victim's testimony regarding her level of confidence in 
her identification of defendant violate defendant's state due process rights? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit eyewitness identification 
evidence is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,781 -
82 & n.3 (Utah 1991). The Court defers to the trial court's underlying factual findings, 
reversing "only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. at 782 & n.3. 
2. Was the trial court required to give a special cautionary instruction regarding the 
corroborated testimony of an accomplice to the crime? 
Standard of Review. The giving of a special cautionary instruction relating to 
corroborated accomplice testimony "is entirely discretionary with the [trial] court," and the 
reviewing court will not reverse a conviction for failure to give such an instruction absent an 
abuse of that discretion. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1999) 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to 
the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, 
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of 
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged defendant and one of his accomplices, Fernando Alberto 
Fernandez, with aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping. R. 3-5,92-95. Defendant 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the case was bound over for trial. See R. 26, 
52. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Fernandez pled guilty to a reduced charge of robbery and 
agreed to testify for the State. R. 254: 248, 256-58. 
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In a pretrial motion, defendant asked the trial court to exclude evidence pertaining to 
the victim's degree of confidence in her identification of defendant. R. 72-74. The trial 
court denied the motion. R. 253: 21-22. Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted 
defendant as charged. R. 98-99,149-51,200-01,253-55. Thejury also found that defendant 
used a firearm and acted in concert with two or more persons, subjecting defendant to 
enhanced penalties under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203 and -203.1 (Supp. 2000). Defendant 
was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of six years-to-life for aggravated robbery and 
fifteen years-to-life for aggravated kidnapping. R. 221-22. He was also ordered to pay 
restitution. R. 222. 
Fifty-five days after sentencing, defendant filed a notice of appeal, together with a 
motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(e). R. 
228-32. The trial court granted the motion. R. 236-37. The Supreme Court thereafter 
transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
(1996). 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Planning a Robbery 
On the afternoon of April 18,2001, defendant (known as "Shorty"), his brother Pato, 
Miguel Pille, Fernando Fernandez (known as "Clown"), a woman named Miguella, and two 
men known as Smiley and Trigger met at a park in Midvale, where they used cocaine and 
methamphetamine. See R. 254: 242-44, 253-54, 263, 277. At Pille's suggestion, the blue 
clad group decided to raid a drug house in South Salt Lake for cocaine and money. R. 254: 
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243-44, 253-55, 274, 282. In planning the robbery, the group decided that defendant and 
Miguella should gain entry first and then telephone the others to follow. See R. 254: 244, 
246,263. Fernandez then called his friend Pablo to join them because they needed his van. 
R. 254: 254, 277. 
After Pablo's arrival, defendant and Miguella left for the drug house in defendant's 
car, followed by the others in Pablo's van. R. 254: 253, 263-65. After parking down the 
street, someone from the group gave defendant a gun. R. 254: 244-45. Defendant and 
Miguella walked toward the house while the others waited in the van. R. 254: 244-46, 264. 
The Wrong House 
At approximately 6:00 p.m., twenty-two-year-old Claryn Miller left for her home 
from the restaurant where she worked. R. 253: 123-24, 148-49. As she approached her 
South Salt Lake town house, she passed a man and woman—defendant and Miguella— 
walking down the street towards her house. R. 253: 124-27, 149-50. She activated her 
automatic door, drove into the garage, and shut off the engine. R.253: 124-25,151. As she 
gathered her belongings inside the car, defendant entered the garage with Miguella and 
knocked on the driver's side window, startling Claryn. R. 253: 125-26. Thinking that he 
might be looking for someone, she rolled down her window. R. 253: 126. 
In broken English, defendant began demanding money and drugs. See R. 253: 126, 
152. When Claryn said that she did not know what he was talking about, defendant lifted up 
his shirt, exposing a handgun, and demanded that she "[c]lose the f_ing garage." R. 253: 
126. Defendant then opened the car door, pulled the gun from his waist, and showed Claryn 
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that it was loaded. R. 253: 127. He put the gun to Claryn's head and ordered her out of the 
car. R. 253: 127, 152. 
After Claryn exited the car, defendant put the gun to her back, took a cell phone that 
she had tried to conceal in her pocket, and directed her toward the door to the house. R. 253: 
127-28,140,156-57. Just before reaching the door, defendant instructed Miguella to retrieve 
handcuffs from a bag. R. 253: 128. When she could not find them, defendant told her to 
look for something else to bind her. R. 253: 128. After Miguella found a pair of nylons, 
defendant pushed Claryn down onto the garage floor and tied her hands and feet together 
behind her back. R. 253: 129-30, 153. He yelled and cursed at Claryn, repeatedly 
demanding money and drugs. R. 253: 127-29, 131-32. Claryn explained that only she and 
three other girls lived at the house. R. 253: 127-29. She told him she did not know what he 
was talking about and that the only money she had was the six dollars in her wallet inside the 
car. R. 253: 127-29, 140. Unpersuaded, defendant called her a liar. R. 253: 127-28. He 
retrieved the wallet from the seat of her car, and after discovering only six dollars, threw it at 
her. R.253: 140, 160-61. 
Defendant then entered the house through the garage door, leaving Miguella with 
Claryn. See R. 253: 133, 144-45, 153-54, 157. Defendant telephoned his cohorts waiting 
outside, and after they knocked on the front door, let them inside. R. 253: 133-34, 154-55, 
168; R. 254: 246,267-68,271.x Pablo remained in the van. R. 254: 271-72. After entering, 
Claryn testified that she believed defendant opened the door. R. 253: 155. 
Fernandez, however, testified that Miguella opened the door. R. 254: 246, 268. 
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the men ransacked the house looking for drugs and money. R. 253: 144-45,154-55,157-59; 
see also R. 254: 269. They found none, but took two rings, some cigarettes, and a second 
cell phone. R. 253: 139-40; R. 254: 250-51. 
Defendant returned to the garage periodically. R. 253: 144-45,154-55, 157; R. 254: 
252. During the encounter, Claryn looked up at defendant some twenty times, until he 
insisted that she keep her face down. R. 253: 132. At one point, a man with a "clown-jester-
type" tattoo over his right eye, later identified as Fernando Fernandez, looked in the garage at 
Claryn, along with another man. R. 253: 133-35, 155, 171; R. 254: 247, 250, 269. After 
rummaging through the house for 15 to 20 minutes, the men decided to leave. R. 253: 133. 
Defendant asked the men whether he should kill Claryn. R. 254:247. Fernandez told him to 
leave her alone. R. 254:247. A fourth man stepped into the garage and told Claryn they had 
the wrong house and would be leaving. R. 253:134. He then turned and instructed everyone 
not to touch Claryn. R. 253: 134. 
After the men left, Claryn continued to lie on the garage floor, fearful they would 
return. R. 253: 135. After a few minutes of waiting, she freed herself and walked into the 
kitchen. R. 253: 135-36, 157. Traumatized by the incident, Claryn vomited on the kitchen 
floor. R. 253:136, Terrified that the men would return, Claryn did not call police, but drove 
to work where she told a co-worker what had happened. R. 253: 136-37. He drove her to 
the house of her neighbor, who was a police officer. R. 253: 138,159; R. 254: 180. The 
neighbor dialed police and Claryn reported the incident. R. 253: 138. Officer Frank Fisher 
was the first officer on the scene, arriving at approximately 9:00 p.m. R. 254: 179, 201. 
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Claryn briefly described what happened, but Officer Fisher did not take a formal statement 
because Claryn was still very distraught, crying and shaking. R. 254: 180-83, 187. 
Identification of Defendant 
A week or two following the robbery, Claryn met with Officer Matt Jewkes, first at 
her parents' home, and then at the police station. R. 253: 162; R. 254: 207-08. She 
recounted the robbery and provided a description of the perpetrators. R. 253: 162, 165; R. 
254: 208, 214-16. Based on those descriptions, police prepared two photo arrays. The first 
included a photograph of Fernando Fernandez, positioned in the number 2 slot. See R. 253: 
162-63; R. 254: 221; SE2. The second included defendant's photograph, positioned in the 
number 5 slot. See R. 254: 210-11, 216, 221, 234; SE1. 
On May 23, 2001, just over a month after the robbery, Officer Jewkes and another 
detective met with Claryn at her place of employment to have her look at the photo arrays. 
R. 253: 141-44; R. 254: 210, 231-32. Officer Jewkes instructed Claryn to look through the 
photographs in each photo array, and if she recognized anyone, to so indicate. R. 253: 142; 
R. 254: 210-13, 232. He also asked that she rate her level of certainty in any identification 
on a scale of 1 to 10. R. 253: 142. She identified Fernandez from the first photo array as the 
man with the "clown-jester-type" tattoo over his eye and rated her level of certainty at 6 or 7. 
R. 253: 143-44,163-64; R. 254: 213. She identified defendant from the second photo array 
as the gunman and rated her level of certainty at 10. R.253: 142-43,164,169; R. 254: 210-
11; SE3. Officer Jewkes also presented two other photo arrays, one of men and one of 
women, but Claryn was unable to identify anyone from those photo arrays. R. 254: 216, 
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234. A week or two later, Officer Jewkes informed Claryn that she had identified two of the 
suspects. R. 253: 166; but see R. 254: 233-34. 
On July 6,2001, Fernandez waived his right to remain silent and spoke with Officer 
Jewkes. R. 254: 235,239-40,249. He admitted that defendant and Miguella had entered the 
house to commit the robbery. See R. 254:249. However, he told Officer Jewkes that he and 
the others never entered the house. See R. 254: 249-50. In a later interview with police, he 
gave the names of all those who participated in the robbery and claimed that defendant had 
taken the second cell phone. R. 254: 251,261-63.2 
Some nine months later, Claryn went to the police station to view a line up arranged 
by defense counsel. R. 253: 146,170. She again identified defendant, who was fifth in the 
line up, indicating that she was 100 percent certain that he was the gunman. R. 253:146-47, 
166-67,170. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Confidence Testimony. Defendant claims that testimony from an eyewitness 
regarding her level of certainty in identifying the defendant is inherently unreliable and thus 
inadmissible under state due process. Defendant cites to no case, in Utah or any other 
jurisdiction, so holding. The only case that has addressed an similar claim rejected it. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has chosen not to include witness confidence as a 
factor to be considered, as a matter of law, in examining the reliability of an identification, it 
2
 At trial, Fernandez testified that he took the second cell phone. R. 254: 251. 
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has not indicated that confidence testimony should be inadmissible at trial. To the contrary, 
Supreme Court decisions suggest that juries may consider confidence testimony. Moreover, 
although the research suggests that the correlation between eyewitness confidence and 
identification accuracy is not as great as juries may otherwise believe, it does not support 
defendant's claim that there is no correlation. Where even a small correlation is found, juries 
are entitled to consider it. Finally, the decisions cited by defendant from other jurisdictions 
addressing eyewitness expert testimony do not support the proposition that confidence 
testimony should be excluded altogether. 
To the extent juries are unaware of the relatively modest correlation between 
confidence and accuracy, a defendant may seek to admit expert testimony on the subject or 
ask for an appropriate instruction. 
II. Accomplice Instruction. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
give his proposed jury instruction advising the jury to view the testimony of defendant's 
accomplice with caution and setting forth factors to be considered when weighing the 
testimony of an informant. Because defendant's testimony was corroborated by the 
testimony of the victim, Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1999) imposed no obligation on the trial 
court to advise the jury that it should view the victim's testimony with caution. Moreover, 
the trial court properly refused to instruct on defendant's proposed credibility factors because 
they were duplicative of other instructions. 
III. Cumulative Error. Where defendant has shown no error prejudicing his right to 
a fair trial, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE VICTIM'S 
"CONFIDENCE" TESTIMONY REGARDING HER IDENTIFICATION 
OF DEFENDANT 
Defendant claims that an eyewitness's testimony regarding his or her level of 
confidence in an identification is inherently unreliable and that it was thus error to admit it at 
trial. Aplt. Brf. at 17-32. Defendant has cited no legal authority, either in Utah or any other 
jurisdiction, holding that confidence testimony is inadmissible because it is inherently 
unreliable. There is none. Indeed, in the only case on point found by the State, the Georgia 
Supreme Court rejected the claim. 
In Jcnes v. State, 539 S.E.2d 143, 148 & n.12 (Ga. 2000), the defendant, like 
defendant here, relied on a number of studies that have undermined the notion that a strong 
correlation exists between witness confidence and identification accuracy. The Georgia 
Supreme Court observed, however, that "[t]hese studies . . . do not demonstrate that every 
eyewitness's confidence in the accuracy of his or her testimony is misplaced/' but rather, 
"depict group behavior, offering expert information about how groups of people perceive 
and react as a basis for evaluating the claims of an eyewitness in a particular case." Jones, 
539 S.E.2d at 148 (footnotes and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The Georgia 
Supreme Court thus concluded that a witness may testify regarding his or her confidence in 
an identification because the studies "do not render every eyewitness's testimony regarding 
his or her confidence inherently unreliable and inadmissible." Id. The Georgia court held 
that a jury may be advised of the "general lack of a correlation between confidence and 
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accuracy," but it retains the right to decide what "weight [is] to be given [confidence] 
testimony." Id. 
This Court should likewise reject defendant's claim, following the rationale of the 
Georgia Supreme Court. 
A. UTAH CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT A SWEEPING BAN ON 
CONFIDENCE TESTIMONY AT TRIAL 
As support for his claim that confidence testimony is inherently unreliable and 
therefore inadmissible as a violation of state due process, defendant points to the decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and State v. Hofjhine, 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265. Aplt. Brf. at 17-22, 
30-31. Those cases, defendant claims, have acknowledged that there is "no correlation" 
between witness confidence and identification accuracy. Aplt. Brf. at 22. He asks this Court 
to take the "next step" and hold that this lack of correlation renders confidence testimony 
inadmissible at trial. This argument fails because a review of Long, Ramirez, and Hofjhine 
reveals that the Supreme Court has not endorsed the broad sweeping claim that eyewitness 
confidence has "no correlation" to identification accuracy. 
State v. Long 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court noted that "the 
literature is replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification." Long, 721 P.2d at 488. It discussed numerous factors and cognitive 
strategies that adversely affect the accuracy of an individual's memory, including those that 
are not commonly understood and that are even counter-intuitive. Id. at 488-90. Concluding 
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that jurors may give identification testimony too much weight because they are largely 
unaware of its inherent weaknesses, Long directed trial courts to give a cautionary jury 
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is central to the case and the defense requests 
such an instruction. Id. at 490-93. 
The Long court held that the cautionary jury instruction should direct the jury to 
consider the following factors when weighing eyewitness identification testimony: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the 
race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 493. Absent from this list is a witness's level of certainty in his or her identification— 
a factor the United States Supreme Court applies in assessing reliability under federal due 
process. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382 (1972).3 
Long noted that research has "undermined the common notion that the confidence 
with which an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the 
recollection." 721 P.2d at 490. The Court also observed that in one study finding a poor 
confidence-accuracy relationship, the researchers concluded that it is "possible" that the 
J
 Because Biggers recognizes witness confidence as a valid factor in determining the 
reliability of an identification, defendant's claim that federal due process requires the 
exclusion of confidence testimony fails. See Aplt. Brf. at 30. 
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jurors' level of confidence was high "'irrespective of the actual rate of witness accuracy.'" 
Id. at 490-91 (quoting Gary L. Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay, & Tamara J. Ferguson, Accuracy, 
Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psychol. 440, 
447 (1979)). In light of these studies, the Court declined to include it in its list of factors that 
a jury should be directed to consider as a matter of law. 
Significantly, the research was not so compelling as to prompt the Long court to 
require that the cautionary instruction admonish the jury that there is "no correlation" 
between eyewitness confidence and identification accuracy. 
State v, Ramirez 
Later, in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,780-81 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court held 
that in determining the due process reliability of eyewitness identifications under article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution, trial courts should consider the factors set forth in Long, 
rather than those listed in Biggers. Relying on Long's criticism of eyewitness confidence, 
the Court did not include it as a factor for the trial court's preliminary legal determination of 
admissibility. Id. at 778,781. This is not surprising where the research had not confirmed a 
strong correlation between witness confidence and identification accuracy. That is a matter 
best left for consideration by the jury. 
Ramirez, therefore, like Long, merely identified those factors that should be 
considered as a matter of law in determining the reliability of an identification. If after 
considering the Long factors, a trial court finds sufficient indicia of reliability, the issue of 
identification is passed to the jury. As State v. Hoffliine, 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265, 
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demonstrates, the jury is then not only free to consider the Long factors, but also is entitled to 
weigh all the evidence pertaining to the identification, including witness confidence. 
State v. Hoffliine 
In Hoffliine, the trial court concluded that the victim's identification of the defendant 
at a show up shortly after the crime—where he rated his level of certainty at "nine and a 
half on a scale of 1-10—resulted in a "non-identification" because the victim expressed less 
certainty in his identification at the preliminary hearing. Hofjhine, 2001 UT 4, at ^ flj 10, 13. 
Although the trial court suppressed the identification testimony, defendant appealed because 
the court permitted the prosecutor to nevertheless elicit testimony regarding the underlying 
facts of the show up, including the victim's description of the robber and the description of 
the person at the show up. Id. at % 13. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted its rejection in Ramirez of witness confidence as 
a factor "in detenmining the constitutional reliability of an identification" and criticized the 
trial court for finding an unreliable identification based on that factor. See id. at ^ 16 
(emphasis added). After reviewing the five Long factors, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the show up identification met the threshold test for constitutional reliability and that the trial 
court erred in finding otherwise. As such, the Court held, "all evidence of the show up could 
have been admitted." Id. at f 19 (emphasis added). That included the victim's level of 
certainty in her identification. Id. at ffi[ 7, 18 n.3. Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, 
Hoffhine supports the rule that confidence testimony is admissible at trial. 
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State v. Hubbard 
Ramirez and Hoffhine seem to have limited the threshold admissibility analysis to the 
Long factors, prohibiting trial courts from considering factors whose significance may be in 
dispute, such as eyewitness confidence. However, the Supreme Court appears to have since 
retreated from that position in State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953. The Supreme 
Court in Hubbard held that "[w]hile [the Long] factors provide guidance, the list is certainly 
not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered in determining whether 
an identification is reliable, and, therefore, not violative of due process." Id. Then, in 
considering the admissibility of the eyewitness identification, the Supreme Court observed: 
The witnesses' identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter. [The victim], according to Officer Merino, identified 
defendant as the assailant immediately, and without hesitation or equivocation. 
When asked to describe his certainty to Officer Merino, [the victim] said, 
"I'm positive." [A female witness] immediately identified defendant and 
indicated her level of certainty as seven on the ten point scale. 
Id. at t 28 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Hubbard thus specifically relied on 
witness confidence in its examination of the constitutional admissibility of the witnesses' 
identification of defendant. 
Moreover, where Hubbard discussed witness confidence in connection with the 
spontaneity and consistency of the identification, it implied that witness confidence may also 
be related to the issue of "whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter"—the fourth Long factor. Long, 721 P.2d at 493; Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 817. For example, in this case, Claryn rated her level of certainty in the 
identification of defendant from the photo array as a 10 on a scale of 1-10. See R. 253: 142-
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43. She identified defendant nine months later at a lineup, indicating that she was "100 
percent" sure. R. 253: 146-47. From these facts, the jury could reasonably conclude that her 
identification of defendant remained consistent. 
* * * 
In summary, Long, Ramirez, and Hqffhine do not support defendant's claim that 
confidence testimony has no role in a jury's consideration of an eyewitness's identification. 
Long and Ramirez have simply identified those factors that should be considered as a matter 
of law. That does not mean that juries may not consider other factors at trial. Hoffhine, in 
fact, demonstrates that juries are free to consider all evidence surrounding an identification, 
including an eyewitness's confidence in his or her identification. And under Hubbard, it 
appears that trial courts are now also free to consider eyewitness confidence in determining 
the admissibility of an identification. 
B. THE RESEARCH DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
CONFIDENCE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE WITHHELD FROM THE JURY 
Defendant also argues that confidence testimony should not be admitted at trial 
because, he claims, the research subsequent to Long has confirmed that no correlation exists 
between witness confidence and identification accuracy. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24,32. Defendant 
overstates both the results and conclusions of that research. 
1. The Research Does Not Establish That "No Correlation" Exists 
Between Witness Confidence and Identification Accuracy 
By all accounts, the research reported by Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness 
Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship?" 4 Law & 
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Hum. Behav. 243 (1980), upon which Long relied, produced mixed results. See Judith 
McKenna, Molly Treadway, & Michael E. McCloskey, Expert Psychological Testimony on 
Eyewitness Reliability: Selling Psychology Before Its Time, Psychol. & Soc. Pol'y 283, 288 
(1992); People v. Legrand, 141 N.Y.2d 733, 743-44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002). In 
Deffenbacher's review of 25 studies involving 43 assessments of confidence-accuracy 
relationships, a positive correlation was found in 22 assessments and no correlation or a 
slight negative correlation in 21 assessments. Id. "Although several attempts have been 
made to account for the disparate results . . . , none has proven notably successful." 
McKenna, Treadway, & McCloskey, supra, at 288. 
In support of his claim that "no correlation" exists between witness confidence and 
identification accuracy, defendant primarily relies on the more recent analysis of Steven 
Penrod and Brian Cutler, "Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their 
Forensic Relation," 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L 817 (1995). See Aplt. Brf. at 22-23, 32. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, however, Penrod and Cutler's review of the applicable 
research generally found ^positive correlation between witness confidence and identification 
accuracy, albeit a small one.4 For example, in Penrod's own review of 16 studies (1980), he 
4
 The results of these studies are expressed in "r" units, or the correlation coefficient. 
Penrod & Cutler, supra at 823. Penrod and Cutler explain that "[i]f [jurors] know nothing 
about these witnesses, then [they] would have to guess whether each witness is correct or 
incorrect. Simple guessing should produce 50% correct guesses and 50% incorrect guesses 
and a corresponding r = 0 . . . . On the other hand, if (jurors] had access to some very useful 
information [(in this case witness confidence)] and could use that information to correctly 
classify 80% of the witnesses (much better than guessing), the strength or usefulness of [that] 
information would be captured with r = .6 . . . . " Id. 
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found an average correlation of r = .23. Id. In another researcher's review of 31 studies 
(1984), a correlation of r = .07 was found. Id. In the "most exhaustive review to date" of 35 
studies (1987), researchers found an average correlation of r = .25. Id. And finally, in a 
1995 review of 30 studies, researchers reported an average correlation of .29. Id. at 824-25. 
Based on this research, Penrod and Cutler conclude that "confidence in having made a 
correct identification is, at best, only modestly associated with identification accuracy." Id. 
at 825. While as a general proposition the confidence-accuracy correlation may be modest at 
best, it is a positive correlation nonetheless. Confidence testimony thus squarely falls within 
the definition of relevant evidence, having some "tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence/' Utah R. Evid. 401. As Penrod and Cutler concede, the 
research suggests that confident witnesses are "somewhat more likely to be correct" as 
compared to non-confident witnesses. See Penrod & Cutler, supra at 823.5 
Thus, as one expert in the field has concluded, the "sweeping claim [that a confident 
witness is no more likely to be correct than an uncertain witness] is clearly not justified by 
the available psychological research." McKenna, Treadway, & McCloskey, supra, at 288; 
accord Legrand, 141 N.Y.2d at 744 (citing D. Stephen Lindsay, J. Don Read, & Kusum 
5
 Penrod and Cutler indicate that based on studies reporting an r = .25 correlation 
coefficient, 62.5% of the jurors would correctly determine that the witness accurately 
identified the suspect. Penrod and Cutler, supra at 823. Penrod and Cutler conclude that 
"[although this is an improvement over the 50% rate obtained with guessing, it is clearly not 
a tremendous improvement." Id. 
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Sharma, Accuracy and Confidence in Person Identification: The Relationship Is Strong 
When Witnessing Conditions Vary Widely, Psychol. Sci, Vol. 9, No. 3, 215, 218 (1998)). 
Some researchers have even concluded that "a misapplication of scientific precepts has led 
researchers astray" and that the confidence-accuracy relationship may in fact be relatively 
strong. D. Stephen Lindsay, J. Don Read, & Kusum Sharma, Accuracy and Confidence in 
Person Identification: The Relationship Is Strong When the Witnessing Conditions Vary 
Widely, 9 Psychol. Sci. 215 (1998). Indeed, given the multitude of factors that may affect 
the confidence-accuracy correlation, "[t]he relationship between accuracy and confidence 
may be no weaker than the relationship between accuracy and most other factors available 
for jurors to consider." Id.6 
2. The Research Does Not Recommend the Exclusion of Confidence 
Testimony 
In contrast to defendant's claim, none of the experts upon which he relies recommend 
that confidence testimony be excluded altogether. That is not surprising given the fact that 
research has generally confirmed a modest correlation between witness confidence and 
identification accuracy. The available research does suggest, however, that juries tend to 
6
 For example, according to McKenna, the available research does not support the 
simplistic claim (implied in Utah's Long instruction) that stress impairs the ability of a 
witness to accurately recall information about a crime and the perpetrator. McKenna, 
Treadway, & McCloskey, supra at 285. Research indicates instead that "as arousal or stress 
increases from very low to very high levels, performance at first improves but then, as stress 
increases beyond some optimal level, declines." Id. Thus, an optimal level of stress will 
actually increase accuracy. Id. at 285-86. The problem, however, is that "the optimal level 
of stress varies across situations (and probably across individuals)." Id. 
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give too much weight to confidence testimony. See Long, 721 P.2d at 490-91. Penrod and 
Cutler thus recommend that steps be taken "to improve juror sensitivity to the factors that 
influence eyewitness memory and reduce overreliance on factors, such as witness 
confidence, that have limited diagnosticity." Penrod & Cutler, supra at 831, 842 (emphasis 
added). Likewise, John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. Meissner, in 
Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Ct. 
Rev. 12, 24-25 (1999), upon whom defendant also relies—do not object to a jury's 
consideration of witness confidence, but worry that juries are "overly sensitive" to 
confidence testimony. Brigham thus argues that "[w]ithout proper instruction on how each 
of these factors may affect a witness's perceptual ability, jurors are left to rely on their often 
incorrect, intuitive beliefs about how memory works." Id. at 25. Moreover, Mark R. 
Kebbell and David C. Giles, in Some Experimental Influences of Lawyers' Complicated 
Questions on Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy, 134 J. Psychol. 129,137 (2000), simply 
recommend "further research" to determine what factors distort confidence-accuracy 
relationships. 
* * * 
Defendant here had the opportunity to address any concern that the jury would give 
undue weight to witness confidence. He could have sought the admission of expert 
testimony on the confidence-accuracy correlation or insisted on an instruction advising the 
jury that confidence does not necessarily correlate with accuracy. He did neither. 
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Defendant complains on appeal that this Court's decisions in Hubbard, State v. 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, and State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, 63 P.3d 621, 
limit his ability to present the necessary expert testimony. Aplt. Brf. at 26-27. This 
argument is not persuasive. In Hubbard, the Utah Supreme Court observed that it has "not 
adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, at | 14. Therefore, if a defendant can make an 
appropriate showing of necessity before a trial judge, expert testimony on the subject may be 
admitted. A/, atffl 14-17. 
On the other hand, if the trial court determines that proffered expert testimony would 
amount to no more than a lecture, it may entertain the inclusion of an appropriate instruction 
pursuant to Long. Id. at f 17. In that case, the defendant is "certainly able to present 
proposed Long instructions that explain the potential effects of certain circumstances on the 
powers of observation and recollection and present [his] positions on how the Long 
instruction should be given." Id. at ffif 18. The trial court below, in fact, expressed its 
willingness to give an instruction advising the jury that witness confidence is not necessarily 
indicative of identification accuracy. See R. 253: 19-22. Although the Long instruction 
ultimately given to the jury did not address witness confidence, see R. 171-73 (Addendum 
A), defendant did not voice any objection to that instruction or otherwise insist that the jury 
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be instructed on witness confidence, as offered by the trial court earlier. See R. 253: 19-22; 
R. 255:291-93.7 
Even in the absence of expert testimony or a special instruction on witness 
confidence, the jury was unlikely to give undue weight to Claryn's confidence in her 
identification of defendant. The Long instruction did not include witness confidence as a 
factor or otherwise bring witness confidence to the jury's attention. See R. 171-73. 
Moreover, as observed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, it "should come as no surprise to 
the average juror" that witness confidence is not necessarily indicative of accuracy. State v. 
McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107,1115 (Conn. 1999). Thus, even though a jury may be advised 
of this, "there is no basis for assuming that jurors are unaware of this point." McKenna, 
Treadway, & McCloskey, supra, at 288-89. In other words, there is no need for such an 
instruction. 
Before trial, defendant submitted a Long instruction that included a statement 
advising the jury to consider Claryn's confidence testimony with caution and indicating that 
"[sjcience has failed to establish any orrelation" between witness confidence and 
identification accuracy. See R. 84. However, as noted, he took no exception to its absence 
when the court addressed the instructions. R. 255: 291-93. 
In any event, defendant's proposed instruction was inappropriate for two reasons. 
First, the research says nothing about the correlation between Claryn's confidence and her 
accuracy. See Jones, 539 S.E.2d at 148. As such, the statement that the jury should receive 
Claryn's confidence testimony with caution would have amounted to an improper comment 
by the court on the evidence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (providing that "[t]he court shall not 
comment on the evidence in the case"). Second, as discussed above, the research does not 
generally establish no correlation between witness confidence and identification accuracy. 
The instruction would have thus overstated the research. 
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C. THE CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS DO 
NOT SUPPORT HIS CLAIM THAT CONFIDENCE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE 
WITHHELD FROM THE JURY 
Defendant also cites appellate cases from Colorado, Kentucky, and New York, as well 
as from the Third and Sixth circuits, claiming that those jurisdictions have required the 
admission of expert testimony "to show the lack of a correlation between an eyewitness's 
certainty of an identification" and the accuracy of that identification. See Aplt. Brf. at 25-26 
& fhs.16-18, 20. Those decisions, however, only addressed the question of whether expert 
testimony should be admitted to educate the jury on the confidence-accuracy relationship. 
None suggested that confidence testimony should be withheld from the jury altogether—the 
result defendant urges. Defendant's reliance on them, therefore, is misplaced. 
Moreover, defendant has misstated the holdings in those cases. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, the foregoing cases held that admission of expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification is left to the discretion of the trial court. See Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 
7-8 (Colo. 1991) ("declining] to adopt a per se rule of admissibility" of such expert 
testimony, but leaving question to trial court's "broad discretion to evaluate on a case-by-
case basis"); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.WJd 485,488 (Ky. 2002) (holding that trial 
courts have discretion to admit expert eyewitness testimony); People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 
66 (N.Y. 2001) (same); State v. Afathis, 264 F.3d 321, 341-42 (3rd Cir. 2001) (applying 
abuse of discretion standard for expert testimony and rejecting defendant's proposed rule 
"that [any time] an eyewitness has confidence in his identification, a defendant is 
automatically entitled to present testimony that confidence has little or no correlation to 
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accuracy"), cert denied, 535 U.S. 908,122 S.Ct. 1211 (2002); United States v. Smithers, 212 
F.3d 306, 314, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying abuse of discretion standard for expert 
testimony). 
Moreover, only in Mathis did the appellate court reach the ultimate issue as to 
whether the proffered expert testimony should have been admitted. See Campbell, 814 P.2d 
at 8 (remanding with instructions to reevaluate admissibility of proffered expert testimony 
under correct standard); Christie, 98 S.W.3d at 492 ("declining] to determine what factors, 
if any, [expert] should have been allowed to testify to" and remanding with instructions for 
trial court to review admissibility of proffered testimony under correct standard); Lee, 750 
N.E.2d at 67 (finding that trial court abused its discretion in finding proffered expert 
testimony per se inadmissible); Smithers, 212 F.3d at 314, 318 (concluding that trial court 
abused discretion in not conducting hearing to determine whether admission of expert 
testimony was appropriate). 
Defendant also quotes extensively from People v. Wright, 755 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1988), 
for the proposition that California recognizes the lack of a confidence-accuracy correlation. 
Aplt. Brf. at 24-25. However, he fails to note that the quoted remarks came from the 
dissenting opinion. See Aplt. Brf. at 24-25 (quoting, Wright, 755 P.2d at 1071 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting)). In fact, the majority approved an instruction that directed the jury, in weighing 
eyewitness testimony, to consider "[t]he extent to which the witness is either certain or 
uncertain of the identification." Wright, 755 P.2d at 1059,1067. The passage from Wright 
upon which defendant relies is the dissent's criticism of that holding and thus offers no 
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authoritative support for defendant's claim. The instruction approved in Wright, allowing 
the jury to consider confidence testimony, is still followed in California today. See 1 Cal. 
Jury Instr.—Crim. 2.92 (7th ed.); People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442,486 n.5 (Cal. 1998), cert, 
denied, 528 U.S. 862, 120 S.Ct. 152 (1999). 
In summary, the cases cited by defendant do not suggest that confidence testimony is 
so unreliable that it should be excluded at trial. They also reject the less drastic measure of 
requiring expert testimony on the subject whenever eyewitness identification is at issue. 
Instead, they follow the approach taken in Utah, leaving to the trial court's sound discretion 
the decision to admit expert eyewitness testimony. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, at \ 14. 
D. ANY ALLEGED ERROR IS HARMLESS 
In any event, any supposed error in admitting the confidence testimony is harmless. 
Claryn's testimony regarding the robbery and her identification of defendant as the gunman 
was corroborated by Fernando Fernandez, who also participated in the robbery. See R. 254: 
242-84. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, absent Claryn's testimony that she was 
certain defendant was the gunman who robbed her, we have her still unequivocal 
identification of defendant from the photo array, see R. 253:142-43 (picking out defendant's 
picture as "[t]he man that had the gun to my head"), at the lineup, see R. 253: 146-47 
(identifying defendant at the lineup within "[sjeconds, as soon as he walked out"), and again 
at trial, see R. 253: 126-27 (pointing to defendant as the gunman). These simple 
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identifications, void of elaboration, exude confidence. They would convey no less certainty 
than Claryn's statements that she was 100 percent confident in her identification.8 
E. DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT ADMISSION OF CONFIDENCE 
TESTIMONY WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL UNDER RULE 403 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in admitting Claryn's confidence 
testimony because it was unduly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. 
Brf at 31-32. Defendant did not argue rule 403 below, see R. 72-74,253:11-22, nor has he 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider defendant's rule 403 claim. See State v. Hodges, 
2002UT117,f 5, 63P.3d66. 
II. DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION WAS 
NEITHER WARRANTED NOR NECESSARY 
In his second claim on appeal, Aplt. Brf at 33-38, defendant contends that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give his proposed accomplice instruction. See R. 78 (Addendum 
B). That proposed instruction provided: 
You are hereby instructed that the testimony of an informer who provides 
evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with 
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's 
testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is 
Moreover, exclusion of confidence testimony would also preclude defense counsel 
from impeaching a witness based on his or her confidence level. For example, defense 
counsel here could not have impeached Claryn's identifications by pointing out that she rated 
her level of certainty in her identification of Fernando Fernandez at only 6 or 7 on a ten-point 
scale. SeeR. 253: 144. 
26 
for you to determine. In making that determination, you should consider (1) 
whether the witness has received anything (including pay, immunity from 
prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication) in 
exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the informant testified or 
offered statements against an individual but was not called, and whether the 
statements were admitted in that case, and whether the informant received any 
deal, promise, inducement or benefit in exchange for that testimony; (3) 
whether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal 
history of the informant; (5) any other evidence relevant to the informer's 
credibility. 
R. 78. Defendant argues that the proposed instruction was necessary to ensure that the jury 
carefully considered the testimony of Fernando Fernandez, his co-perpetrator. Aplt. Brf at 
33-35. Defendant's claim lacks merit 
A. THE OBLIGATION TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
The trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the 
case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1992). The purpose of jury instructions is 
"to assist [jurors] in understanding issues which they have to decide in the case." State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781,798 (Utah 1991). "If there is sufficient evidence to justify a proposed 
instruction on any given issue, the trial court [must] adequately instruct the jury on that 
issue." State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052,1058 (Utah 1985). On the other hand, "the trial court 
is not required to give any requested jury instruction if it does not comport with the facts 
presented or does not accurately state the applicable law." James, 819 P.2d at 799. 
Where the evidence so warrants, "[a] criminal defendant is entitled to have the gist of 
his defense reflected in the instructions given to the jury." State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 
(Utah App. 1989); accord Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238. However, the "precise wording and 
specificity [of instructions] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court". Aly, 782 P.2d at 
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550; accord State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,266 (Utah 1988) (holding that "the framing of 
instructions lies in the trial judge's discretion"). As a result, a proposed instruction by 
defendant need not be given "'if the point is properly covered in the other instructions/" 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 (quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982)). All 
that is required is that the instructions provide defendant with the legal framework to argue 
his theory of the case. See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. 
B, THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE LAW 
1. Defendant Was Not Entitled to an Instruction Requiring the Jury to 
Weigh the Testimony of Fernandez With Greater Care than an 
Ordinary Witness 
Under defendant's proposed instruction, the jury would have initially been instructed 
"that the testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a defendant must be 
examined and weighed... with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness." R. 
78. Relying on a number of federal decisions, defendant contends that such a cautionary 
instruction is required "whenever an accomplice testifies as part of a plea bargain." Aplt. 
Brf. at 35-37 & fn.31. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
The trial court's responsibility to give a special accomplice instruction is governed by 
section 77-17-7, which provides: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to 
the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, 
and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of 
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1999). Therefore, as observed by the Utah Supreme Court, a 
special cautionary instruction is mandatory only if two conditions are met: (1) "the 
accomplice testimony is 'uncorroborated' and [(2)] 'the trial judge finds the testimony of the 
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1226 (Utah 1993) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7). If the first condition is met, 
but not the second, giving the instruction is discretionary. See State v. Pierce, 111 P.2d 780 
(Utah 1986). 
Defendant does not meet the first condition. Although Fernandez was an accomplice 
to the robbery, his testimony was not uncorroborated. Claryn, the victim of the robbery, also 
positively identified defendant as the gunman and as a participant in the robbery. See R. 
253: 126-27,142-43,146-50,164-70; R. 254:210-11. Because the first condition is not met 
under section 77-17-7, defendant was not entitled to an instruction advising the jury to view 
Fernandez's testimony with caution. Nor did the trial court otherwise abuse its discretion in 
refusing to include such an instruction where the jury was well aware of defendant's motive 
to lie. See State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091,1096 (Utah) (holding that trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing cautionary instruction where accomplice was thoroughly cross-
examined and where testimony was corroborated), cert denied, 487 U.S 1220 (1988); Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1226 (holding any error harmless where jury had ample evidence of 
accomplice's motivation to lie and where jury received credibility instruction).9 
9
 Because the first condition was not met, the Court need not address the second 
condition. 
29 
2. Instruction No. 8 Covered the Relevant Factors Identified in 
Defendant's Proposed Instruction 
Defendant's proposed instruction also identified several factors that should be 
considered in judging the credibility of an informant. See R. 78. Because these factors were 
adequately covered in other instructions, the trial court properly refused to give them as well. 
The trial court below gave the jury a total of thirty-five instructions following the 
close of all the evidence. See R. 152-90. Instruction No. 8 discussed the jury's obligation in 
judging the credibility of the witnesses: 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence. In judging the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of their testimony, you can take into consideration their bias, if any is 
shown, their interest, if any, in the result of the lawsuit, either as parties or 
otherwise, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify as they do, if any is 
shown. You may consider whether any witness contradicted himself, the 
witnesses' deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness or lack 
thereof of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor or the want of it, 
their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, their capacity to 
remember and any other fact or circumstance which you believe may have a 
bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the statements of witnesses, and 
determine therefrom, in accordance with your honest convictions, what weight 
and credibility you should give to the testimony of each witness, measured by 
reason and common sense and the rules set forth in these instructions. 
R. 160 (Addendum C). This instruction contained the substance of defendant's proposed 
instruction in judging the credibility of Mr. Fernandez and no more was required. 
The first credibility factor in the proposed instruction was "whether the witness has 
received anything . . . in exchange for [his] testimony." R. 78. This factor is aimed at the 
effect a plea bargain may have on the credibility of a co-perpetrator who has turned State's 
evidence. Instruction No. 8 covered this concern and more, advising the jury that it may 
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consider any bias of the witnesses, "their interest... in the result of the lawsuit,... or any 
probable motive or lack thereof to testify as they do . . . ." R. 160. A reasonable jury will 
understand that a plea deal with a co-perpetrator that is dependent on his testimony against 
defendant will create a motive for the co-perpetrator to lie at trial. The jury thus understood 
from the instruction that it could, and should, consider that plea agreement in judging the co-
perpetrator's credibility. 
Another factor identified in the proposed instruction was "whether the informant has 
ever changed his or her testimony." R. 78. Instruction No. 8 likewise advised the jury that it 
could consider "whether any witness contradicted himself." R. 160. The proposed 
instruction also would have advised the jury to consider "the criminal history of the 
informant" and "any other evidence relevant to the informer's credibility." R. 78. 
Instruction No. 8 likewise instructed the jury that it could consider "any other fact or 
circumstance which. . . may have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the statements 
of witnesses . . . . " R. 160. Although Instruction No. 8 did not specifically identify a 
witness's criminal history as a factor in judging credibility, a reasonable jury would 
understand that a prior felony is a "fact or circumstance which... may have a bearing on the 
truthfulness or accuracy" of a witness's testimony. See R. 160. 
Finally, the proposed instruction would have advised the jury that it could consider 
"any other case in which the informant testified or offered statements against an individual 
but was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in that case, and whether the 
informant received any deal, promise, inducement or benefit in exchange for that testimony." 
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R. 78. This factor pertains to confidential informants regularly used by the police. However, 
nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Fernandez was a police informant. See generally R. 
253-54. Because "the trial court is not required to give any requested jury instruction if it 
does not comport with the facts presented/' defendant was not entitled to such an instruction. 
See James, 819 P.2d at 799. 
Moreover, as the following excerpt from the closing argument reveals, the instructions 
given by the trial court did in fact give defendant the "legal framework" necessary to argue 
his theory of the case. Defense counsel argued: 
We know he is a liar. Even admitted it here, under oath, in each of his 
interviews. I suppose it is fair to say from that probably everything he has 
ever done in his life. But he has been in prison. He is brought into this case 
under one set of circumstances, looking for a deal from the very first 
second.... 
. . . He wants to lay people out, because right from the start he is talking 
about saving time, life in prison, saving charges. He has been in prison. And 
he just starts to throw out everybody, names, names, names. He is 
interviewed again. He finally admits it then, because in order to get a plea 
bargain you have to plea. He has an attorney now. To get something sweet, 
you are going to have to testify. You heard him say advice of counsel and 
everything else. And he does it. But he has to admit it at that point. 
. . . He is finding anybody out there who he knows about as an associate or 
he knows about from anything else to provide names. He knows he has to 
give them something that works, or he is not going to get his deal; in other 
words, that works with them, that the Government believes, already, is 
involved in something. He knows, he admitted, he has reports, he knows 
[defendant] is a name that has come up and has been identified and picked out. 
So, throwing out all the names, he includes [defendant], and he tells what 
happened there, probably, to a certain extent. He is a robber. He is getting a 
sweet deal.... 
. . . / mean, there is no question that Fernando was going to say what he 
thought he needed for his deal, because he was willing to completely flip-
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flop right here in trial. He was willing to realize that, Oh, I said I didn V see 
him go in the house. I need to change that here in the trial. You imagine 
what's in the back of his mind. Whoops, I hope I haven yt screwed up my 
deal. I am getting sentenced in a couple of weeks. 
R. 255: 315-16, 320. 
In sum, the factors identified in defendant's proposed instruction were either covered 
in Instruction No. 8 or were inapplicable under the facts of this case. The trial court was not 
required to duplicate those instructions. Moreover, as in Standiford, the trial court's 
instructions "gave defendant the legal framework for his theory of the case, and counsel's 
arguments to the jury clearly elucidated the factual and legal issues from defendant's point of 
view." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. 
III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER THE 
CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE 
In his final claim on appeal, defendant contends that this Court should reverse his 
conviction and remand for a new trial because the cumulative effect of the trial court errors 
prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Aplt. Brf. at 39-42. However, where, as here, the 
defendant "has failed to establish any errors ... that prejudiced his right to a fair trial, the 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah), 
cert denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \°\ 
An important question in this case is the identification of 
the defendant as the person who committed the crime. The 
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, 
not only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant 
was the person who committed the crime. If, after considering the 
evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by Claryn Miller. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that Ms. Miller was &m& 
insincere, but merely that she was mistaken in her belief or 
impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you 
should consider the following: 
1. Did Ms. Miller have an adequate opportunity to observe 
the criminal actor? In answering this question, you should 
consider: 
(a) the length of time she observed the actor; 
(b) the distance between Ms. Miller and the actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
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(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of 
Ms. Miller to observe the person committing the 
crime. 
2. Did Ms. Miller have the capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime? In answering this question, you should 
consider whether the capacity of Ms. Miller was impaired by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) fatigue or injury. 
3. Whether Ms. Miller is of a different race than the 
criminal actor. Identification by a person of a different race may 
be less reliable than identification by a person of the same race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by Ms. Miller 
completely the product of her own memory? In answering this 
question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the original 
observation of Ms. Miller and the identification of 
the defendant by Ms. Miller; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of Ms. Miller 
at the time of the identification; 
(c) her exposure to opinions, to photographs, or to any 
other information or influence that may have 
affected the independence of the identification of 
the defendant by Ms. Miller; 
(d) any instance when she failed to identify the 
defendant; 
(e) any instances when she gave a description of the 
actor that is inconsistent with the defendants 
appearance; 
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(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to Ms. Miller for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made from 
seeing the person are generally more reliable than identifications 
made from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the 
prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the 
eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
the person who committed the crime charged, and you find all of the 
other elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty of the crime charged. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed 





INSTRUCTION NO. / 
You are hereby instructed that the testimony of an informer who provides evidence against 
a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with greater care than the testimony of an 
ordinary witness. Whether the informer's testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice 
against the defendant is for you to determine. In making that determination, you should consider (1) 
whether the witness has received anything (including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in 
prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in 
which the informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and 
whether the statements were admitted in that case, and whether the informant received any deal, 
promise, inducement or benefit in exchange for that testimony; (3) whether the informant has ever 
changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history of the informant; (5) any other evidence 
relevant to the informer's credibility. 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, 
you can take into consideration their bias, if any is shown, 
their interest, if any, in the result of the lawsuit, either as 
parties or otherwise, or any probable motive or lack thereof to 
testify as they do, if any is shown. You may consider whether 
any witness contradicted himself, the witnesses' deportment upon 
the witness stand, the reasonableness or lack thereof of their 
statements, their apparent frankness or candor or the want of 
it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, 
their capacity to remember and any other fact or circumstance 
which you believe may have a bearing on the truthfulness or 
accuracy of the statements of witnesses, and determine 
therefrom, in accordance with your honest convictions, what 
weight and credibility you should give to the testimony of each 
witness, measured by reason and common sense and the rules set 
forth in these instructions. 
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